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INTRODUCTION
With the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) dominated by China and 
the BRICS New Development Bank, Infrastructure finance has received tremendous attentions and become 
a hot issue worldwide. It is publicly recognized that “Quality infrastructure plays a critical role in achieving 
sustainable development. It contributes to economic growth and competiveness, fosters a diversified and 
deep productive sector, provides greater access to fundamental services that improve quality of life and 
promote social equality, and bolsters national and regional integration”(IDFC, 2015). 
However, there existed a substantial gap between supply and demand of infrastructure services in the 
developing world. Furthermore, rapid per capita income increases in many emerging countries will amplify the 
scale and pace of infrastructure demand. According to a predict of OECD, the infrastructure investment needs 
across land transport, telecommunications, electricity and water and sanitation sectors could amount to an 
estimated USD 53 trillion through 2030. The annual investment requirement would equal more than 2.5% of 
world GDP (Williams, 2014). Bhattacharya and Holt (2015) also estimate that the gap between current and 
required investment in infrastructure in emerging and developing economies to reach US$1–1.5 trillion per year 
for the core sectors only between 2014 and 2030, and these vast unmet infrastructure needs will constrain 
economic growth on a sufficient scale. 
Obviously, the considerable demand for infrastructure investment cannot be satisfied by the public sector 
alone. Private capitals should be encouraged to flow into the infrastructure sectors to narrow the prevailing 
gap. Unfortunately, the 2007-08 global financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis has significanlty 
reduced traditional financing sources for infrastructure sectors, such as public expenditure and private bank 
lending. The Basel III has tightened the regulatory framework for the financial sector at both the national and 
international levels, and increased the cost of long-term financing, which provides incentives for commercial 
banks to focus on short-term liquidity and solvency and prefer more short-term projects as well as those 
perceived less risky (Williams, 2014; Griffith-Jones and Kollatz, 2015). This provides a clear rational for 
national development banks to help fill the existed massive gap in infrastructure finance. 
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2Table 1 National Development Banks in East Asia
Name Year Capital
($bn)
 Loan 
($bn)
Asset
($bn) % of GDP
Development Bank 
of Japan(DBJ)
Established in 1951
10.1 112.0 136.0 3.0%
Korea Development 
Bank(KDB)
Established in 1954
Privatized in Oct. 2009
Re-publicized in Jan. 2015
23.3 123.0 199.5 14.1%
Korea Finance 
Corporation (KoFC)
Established in 2009
Merged with KDB in 
Jan.2015
27.3 123.9 245.1 17.4%
KDB＋KoFC Relaunched in 2015 50.6 246.9 444.6 31.5%
China Development 
Bank (CDB)
Established in 1994
157.7 1280.9 1663.9 16.1%
Source: DBJ, KDB, CDB and BVD. 
Note: The calculation date of the amount of capital, asset, and loan of DBJ is March 31, 2015, and that of KDB and 
KoFC is December 31, 2014 and December 31, 2013 respectively. The calculation date of CDB’s asset and loan is 
December 31, 2014, while that of capital is August 2015. 
In regards with infrastructure finance, China Development Bank (CDB) is a successful and 
aggressive one among national development banks. CDB is a wholesale lender specializing in 
providing medium-to long-term financing facilities, focuses on the development of infrastructures, 
basic and key industries. CDB ranked 122nd among the world 500 top banks in 2014 and has 
maintained the status as one of the largest development banks in the world for several consecutive 
years. As the end of 2014, the magnitude of CDB’s asset and loan increased to $1663.9bn, 
$1280.9bn, not only substantially surpasses those of its main peers in East Asia, like Development 
Bank of Japan (DBJ) and Korea Development Bank (KDB) (see Table 1)1, but also significantly 
exceeds those of multinational and regional development banks such as World Development Bank 
and Asian Development Bank. However, in perspective of the share of asset in GDP, the recently 
relaunched Korea Development Bank (KDB merged KoFC in Jan. 2015) reached 31.5%, which was 
substantially higher than that of CDB and DBJ, and their level were 16.1% and 3.0% respectively. 
1  Korea Development Bank (KDB) is a state-owned bank founded in 1954. KDB’s primary business area is corporate banking 
and it has provided huge amounts of industrial capital to Korean enterprises through loans, investments, and guarantees since its 
establishment, which has significantly stimulated the development of Korean industries and economy. In October 2009, KDB, the 
nation’s largest state policy lender, was officially started its privatization process, and which operated as a subsidiary of KDB Fi-
nancial Group. At the same time, the Korea Finance Corporation (KoFC) was established, a quasi-sovereign agency with a 100% 
direct ownership by the Korean government, mandated to support the sound growth of the Korean economy, which inherited 
KDB’s some policy-financing business involving government support for certain areas of business and industry. 
The intention of the former Lee Myung-bak administration to privatize KDB is to make KDB a specialized investment like JPM-
organ or Morgan Stanley, but President Park Geun-hye withdrew the privatization plan in August 2014 and in favor of the merger 
of KBD and KoFC, who thought that there existed some overlap between the two financial institutions. On January 1 2015, KDB 
and KoFC were announced to be merged and relaunched. KDB was recategorized as a public institution, and KoFC’s overseas 
finance business will be handed over to the Export-Import Bank of Korea. The merger will enhance both institutions’ roles in 
funding start-ups, corporate restructuring and overseas projects, and preparing financial policies for unification of the Korean 
peninsula (Song, 2014).
3In the new century, with China became a main export platform in the world and the application 
of China “Go Global” Strategy, CDB another important mission is to ensure the stability of external 
resources and energy supply through providing overseas loans. CDB has financed a number of high-
profile cross-border energy-backed loans to foreign government entities and energy companies, 
such as Venezuela, Russia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina, featuring with large magnitude and 
long-term. The collapse of prices of petroleum and resultant economic crisis in Latin America 
particularly Venezuela, has constituted a serious threat to the smooth repayment of CDB’s overseas 
petroleum-backed loans.
With the application of the initiative of “One Belt and One Road” (The Silk Road Economic 
Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road), it is expected that the expansion of CDB’s overseas 
assets will accelerate in the future years. According to the sources from media, CDB has reserved 
dozens of megaprojects in infrastructure, resources and other key industries, in the regions along 
the “One Belt and One Road”. To support the active involvement in the construction of “One Belt 
and One Road”, CDB had received a capital injection of $38bn from the Chinese Parasol Tree 
Investment Platform Co. in July 2015, an investment vehicle of Chinese foreign reserve under the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). This makes the PBOC become the third largest 
shareholder of CDB, with a share of 27.19%, just next to Ministry of Finance of China, and the 
Central Huijin Company. 
In the past twenty decades, China’s infrastructure construction and development has achieved 
significant achievements, shifting from a country deficient in infrastructure to one which is strong 
in infrastructure design, construction and finance (China still has a long distance to overtake 
western peers in infrastructures management and operation). The gap between the supply and 
demand of infrastructure in China has been substantially reduced. In the process, CDB has played 
a leading and catalytic role. Taking advantages of sovereign credit and the status of policy bank, it 
not only directly lends large amount of long-term fund to infrastructure sectors, but also indirectly 
encourages capitals of commercial banks and private investors to flow into the sectors through 
providing planning service, initial credit support, helping to create investment and financing 
vehicles, technical assistance, risk mitigation and guarantee, and so on.
It is critically important for national development banks in emerging and developing countries, 
and new regional and multinational development banks such as the AIIB and the New Development 
Bank, to learn from the experiences and lessons of CDB in sustainable infrastructure finance. To 
this end, the paper will conduct an in-depth analysis on the business models, loan compositions, 
cases, and practices and policies of CDB in infrastructure finance. The framework of the rest of the 
paper is arranged as follows: the first section analyzes CDB’s business model in terms of assets, 
overseas transactions, M&A activities, debt issuance, and crowd-in effect. The second section 
estimates the size and composition of CDB’s loans to infrastructure and sustainable infrastructure 
4sectors, based on the data of CDB, China-Latin America Finance Database, and Dealogic database. 
The third section discusses CDB’s Wuhu Model and Tianjin Model in infrastructure finance. The 
fourth section summarizes CDB’s practices and policies in sustainable infrastructure finance. The 
final section concludes the paper and puts forward some policy suggestions.
2.  Business Models
2.1  Assets 
China Development Bank (hereafter CDB) focuses on national economic strategy and provides 
medium-to-long run financing facilities to the economy, with the aim to break through production 
bottlenecks and assist in the long-run sustainable development of Chinese economy and society. 
To implement the mission, CDB has taken following actions: supporting the development of 
national infrastructure, basic industry, key emerging sectors, and national priority projects; 
promoting coordinated regional development and urbanization by financing low-income housing, 
small business, agricultural/rural investment, education, healthcare, and environment initiatives; 
facilitating China’s cross-border investment and global business cooperation (CDB, 2015)2. Most 
of CDB’s loans were allocated into infrastructure projects, basic industries, and pillar industries, 
with an aggregate volume of $1490.3bn during the period from 2006 to 2014 (see Table 2).
After decades of rapid expansion in business activities, particularly since the global financial 
crisis, CDB is now the world’s largest development bank in terms of total assets (which rose from 
$107.6bn in 2001 to $1663.9bn in 2014), with an average annual growth rate of 23.7%, and an 
increasing share in China’s GDP (which also rose significantly from 8.08% in 2001 to 16.07% 
in 2014). Currently, the first priority of CDB is to support large-scale national projects such as 
the North-South Water Diversion Project, the Three Gorges Dam, as well as local infrastructure 
projects like airports, roads, high-speed railways, and hydropower stations.
2.2  Overseas Transactions
Since the creation of the ‘Going Out’ policy at the turn of the century, CDB makes use of 
different methods to promote overseas investments in infrastructure projects, expand its global 
portfolio and support Chinese companies abroad (Provaggi, 2013). CDB has played an important 
role in financing the overseas activities of Chinese state-owned enterprises, particularly aiding 
SOEs to acquire oil and other natural resources. It also has directly extended energy (oil)-backed 
loans to foreign authorities to guarantee the supply of natural resources and energy to the Chinese 
economy. In fact, supporting Chinese business expansion abroad through mid-and long-term credit 
2  CDB, “Mission Statement”, http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/Column.asp? ColumnId=99, October 2015.
5is one of CDB’s five priority areas.
To implement the “Go Global” strategy and enhance the stability of external resources supply, 
CDB also has played an important role in providing credit to Chinese enterprises’ cross-border 
transactions and direct investment, particularly natural resources and infrastructure projects. CDB 
has set up work teams to go and live in around one hundred countries and made each branch at 
home look after a different part of the world, for example, the Shandong branch handles Venezuela, 
and the Shijiazhuang branch in Hebei Province handles Peru, although large investments have to 
be sent to the headquarter (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013). 
6Table 2 Financial Indicators of China Development Bank Group
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7The rising speed of CDB in cross-border finance is quite rapid: at the end of 2014, the bank 
reported that its outstanding foreign currency loans amounted to $272.8bn, a more than sevenfold 
increase over its foreign currency lending eight years earlier, with an average annual growth rate 
of 39.8%. The CDB has provided cross-border loans in more than 90 countries and regions around 
the world. The volume of CDB’s overseas loans has steadily surpassed Bank of China, the bank 
traditionally dealing with foreign exchange and lending overseas, as the biggest overseas lender in 
China for some years. However, CDB has been overtaken by Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China in recent years due to the latter’s aggressive expansion in international business. 
As Figure 1 shows, CDB’s overseas loans are mainly allocates into the region of Asia-Pacific, 
Americas, and Euro-Asia, and the amount of loans lent to Africa, and Euro-Africa is much lower. 
As the end of 2014, the balance of CDB’s loan to Asia-Pacific amounted to $ 153.0bn, with a 
share in its total cross-border loans of 56.1%, and that of CDB’s credit to Americas, and Euro-Asia 
reached $51.3bn and $36.6bn respectively, with a share of 18.8% and 13.4%.
Figure 1 Regional Structure of CDB’s Overseas Loan Balance as the end of 2014 ($bn)
Source: CDB. 
According to an incomplete statistics of Dealogic Database and China-Latin America Finance 
Database3, in addition to some international financial centers like Hong Kong and Singapore, CDB’s 
cross-border credits were mainly allocated into countries rich in energy and resources (oil, gas 
and mineral ores), such as Venezuela, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, and Peru, and China’s 
neighbors in Asia like India, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan (see Table 
3  Due to limited capabilities of collecting information of bank loans, Dealogic Database and China-Latin America 
Finance Database can’t fully search and track CDB’s loans. Regarding the scale and structure of CDB loans, there 
are some obvious differences between the above two database and CDB. Hence, the statistics of Dealogic and 
China-Latin America Finance Database about the loan deals of CDB is incomplete.
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83). As Table 3 shows, CDB had provided loans to borrowers from forty countries (economies) 
over the period from 2008 to April 2015, with an aggregate worth around $233bn and a share of 
60.2% in CDB’s total credit. Of which, Venezuela, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, and India 
are six largest debtors, whose debt amounted to $60.7bn, $29.3bn, $22.3bn, $1.98bn, $1.77bn, 
and $1.48bn respectively, with a share of 15.7%, 7.6%, 5.8%, 5.1%, 4.6%, and 3.8% in CDB’s 
overseas credits correspondingly.  
In recent years, CDB has extended large amount (up to $20.6 billion) of long-run (up to twenty 
years) energy-backed loans to foreign energy companies and government entities of countries such 
as Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Russia, and Turkmenistan, which have faced cash flow problems and 
can’t borrow such huge and long term capitals from other financial institutions. The energy-backed 
loans generally include an agreement over the loan and the sale of oil. Chinese oil companies buy 
the oil and deposit the payments into the CDB account of the foreign company. CDB takes the 
money it is owed directly from the account. The oil is paid at the market price of the day when it 
is received, not at a pre-established price. The agreement normally requires the borrower to buy 
Chinese equipment for infrastructure development (Downs, 2011; Provaggi, 2013).
9Table 3 CDB’s Borrowers Ranking by Nationality/Economy from 2008 to April 2015
Source: Dealogic, China-Latin America Finance Database, and Author’s Collection. 
The government of Venezuela is CDB’s largest foreign borrower. CDB has extended cumulative 
credit lines of around $60bn to Venezuela’s Ministry of Finance, Bank for Economic and Social 
Development (BANDES), and national oil company-Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA). The 
governments of China and Venezuela established the China-Venezuela Joint Investment Fund 
(JIF), administered by BANDES, to finance the infrastructure and social projects in Venezuela. 
CDB contributed two thirds of the fund to JIF, and Venezuelan financial institutions provided 
the remaining one-third. Projects financed by the JIF include the satellite Simón Bolívar, five 
metro lines (two in Caracas and one each in Los Teques, Valencia and Maracaibo), the train from 
Cúa to Encrucijada, the Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho highway, and others in agriculture, people’s 
livelihood, basic industries, petroleum, and river conservation (Downs,2011; Research Academy of 
China Development Bank, 2012). It is worthy of noting that CDB’s oil-backed loans to Venezuela 
has faced tremendous default risk, due to the collapse of oil price and subsequent Venezuelan 
economic crisis, and social and political instability.  
 
Rank 
Deal 
Nationality 
(Economy) 
Deal Value Deal 
No. 
 
Rank 
Deal 
Nationality 
(Economy) 
Deal Value Deal 
No. $mn Share 
(%) 
$mn Share 
(%) 
1 China 154065 39.78  161 21 Philippines 610 0.16  2 
2 Venezuela 60700 15.67  15 22 
Papua New 
Guinea 600 0.15  1 
3 Russia 29330 7.57  4 23 Bolivia 551 0.14  2 
4 Brazil 22296 5.76  8 24 UK 550 0.14  1 
5 Argentina 19817 5.12  7 25 Zambia 550 0.14  1 
6 Australia 17722 4.58  10 26 South Korea 511 0.13  1 
7 India 14809 3.82  14 27 Germany 500 0.13  1 
8 Hong Kong 8734 2.25  6 28 Jamaica 495 0.13  2 
9 Uzbekistan 8150 2.10  2 29 Egypt 480 0.12  1 
10 Peru 6957 1.80  2 30 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 444 0.11  1 
11 Ecuador 6500 1.68  4 31 Greece 306 0.08  5 
12 Indonesia 5879 1.52  11 32 Chile 300 0.08  2 
13 Vietnam 5581 1.44  10 33 Turkey 300 0.08  1 
14 Pakistan 5220 1.35  4 34 Puerto Rico 225 0.06  1 
15 Singapore 5161 1.33  7 35 Taiwan 172 0.04  1 
16 South Africa 3751 0.97  3 36 Malaysia 145 0.04  1 
17 Kazakhstan 2400 0.62  2 37 Italy 127 0.03  1 
18 Norway 1400 0.36  1 38 Canada 100 0.03  1 
19 Ghana 1000 0.26  1 39 Peru 50 0.01  1 
20 Saudi Arabia 800 0.21  1 40 Serbia 42 0.01  1 
	
10
2.3  M&A Activities
CDB’s meager and acquisition transactions had mainly been conducted by its subsidies such 
as China Development Bank Capital and China Africa Fund. Its equity investment didn’t focus 
on infrastructure sector and covered many industries including mining, oil and gas, finance, 
manufactures, infrastructure, construction, real estate, chemicals, computers, and electronics. The 
sectors of CDB’s M&A activities in infrastructure involved oil and gas refinery, port terminal, 
transportation-ship, solar power, and other infrastructure. Over the period from 1998 to April 
2015, CDB had conducted 42 M&A deals, with a total worth of $18.2bn. Among them, there are 
six infrastructure M&A deals and two sustainable infrastructure M&A transactions, whose share 
in the number of the total M&A deals is 14.3% and 4.8% respectively. The value of CDB’s M&A 
transactions for infrastructure and sustainable infrastructure over the period is $4.10bn and $250mn 
respectively, and whose share in the aggregate M&A deals is 22.6% and 1.4% correspondingly 
(see Table A-2).
2.4  Debt Issuance
Supported with sovereign credit and good market performance, CDB can primarily raises 
its own capital through issuing long-term (sometimes up to 50 years) and lower interest bonds 
to various institutional investors, including commercial banks, credit cooperatives, insurance 
companies, funds, wealth management plans of commercial banks, securities companies and 
overseas organizations, on China’s interbank bond market and foreign markets. This alleviates 
CDB’s reliance on short-term bank deposits, in contrast with China’s commercial banks.
Figure 2 The Volume of Debt Issued by China Development Bank
Source: CDB.
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Since the establishment, the volume of CDB’s annual debt issuance had shown a generally 
strong growth momentum, rising substantially from RMB 75.4bn ($8.75bn) in 1994 to RMB 
1175bn ($191.4bn) in 2014, with an average annual growth rate of 17.1%, and whose share in 
China’s GDP slightly increased from 1.55% in 1994 to 1.83% in 2014. As of the end of 2014, 
CDB’s aggregate debt issuance reached RMB 10.7tn ($1.73tn), and equaled to 16.7% of China’s 
GDP in 2014, with an annual average growth rate of 29.5% during the past two decades (see Figure 
2).
Figure 3 The Onshore Market Share of CDB’s RMB Debts in 2014
Source: CDB.
As displayed by Figure 3, in China’s onshore RMB bond market, CDB is the second largest 
bond issuer just next to Chinese national and local governments. In 2014, the share of CDB’s 
RMB debts in China’s RMB bond market amounted to 17.7%, and that of treasuries and monies, 
medium-term notes, and corporate bond was 28.9%, 9.2%, and 8.2% respectively. The market 
share of RMB bonds issued by the two other policy banks in China, Agricultural Development 
Bank of China and Exim Bank of China, was 5.9% and 4.4% respectively in 2014, and which was 
substantially lower than that of CDB. 
In terms of issuing asset backed securities4, CDB is a leading bank in China. In the three 
preceding quarters of 2015, CDB has issued asset backed securities five times, with value around 
RMB 40bn ($6.4bn). As of the end of September 2015, CDB had issued an aggregate of RMB 
166.4bn ($26.1bn) worth of asset backed securities, and it was ranked top among Chinese banks, 
by bond issue times and size, and bond variety coverage.
4  Securitization involves the transfer of a pool of illiquid assets to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that issues tiers of the 
repackaged instruments as tradable securities directly linked to the performance of the purchased assets. In the case of infrastruc-
ture asset securitization, the corresponding cash flows often refer to the fares, rights or tolls related to the use of the infrastructure 
asset. This methodology is primarily intended to redistribute credit risk from the original lender to a wide spectrum of investors 
who can bear the risk, thus fostering financial stability and market liquidity, as well as generating an additional source of funding.
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CDB is a critically important issuer of foreign currency bonds in domestic and international 
bond market. In China’s onshore bond market, CDB is the largest issuer of foreign currency bonds. 
As of the end of July 2015, the total amount of foreign currency bonds that CDB had issued reached 
around US$ 11.7bn, accounting for 81% of the total market volume. With worldwide recognized 
quasi-sovereign debt status, good operating performance and extensive bond-issuing experience, 
CDB also has a strong record of successful bond issuance in international bond markets, such as, 
first JPY Samurai bond in 1996, first Yankee bond in 1997, global USD bond in 2004, and euro 
bond in 2005. 
It is worthy of noting that the bank contributed significantly to RMB internationalization 
through issuing “dim sum bonds” in Hong Kong capital market. As of the end of July 2015, CDB 
had issued an aggregate of RMB 28bn ($4.5bn) worth of offshore RMB bonds, with maturities 
ranging from 2 to 20 years, and the outstanding bonds reached around RMB 14.1bn ($2.3bn), 
making it the largest issuer of RMB bonds in Hong Kong market in terms of issue size, outstanding 
balance and variety (CDB, 2015). 
2.5  Crowd-in Effect
In filling the gap between demand and supply of infrastructure, development banks can play 
a unique “crowd-in” role as financial catalysts, attracting private domestic and abroad capital into 
large, long-term infrastructure projects in countries and sectors where significant development 
results are likely, but the market perceives high risks, through offering project selection and design, 
below-market interest rates, long-term repayment schedule, risk mitigation (political or partial 
risk insurance and loan guarantee), technical assistance, and other tools for capacity building that 
promote the transparent use of resources, accountability, cost-effective delivery and long-run 
project sustainability (Williams, 2014). 
CDB has played a critical “crowd-in” role of drawing capitals from commercial banks, 
financial institutions and private investors, through planning in advance, selecting projects with 
local governments, proving long-term capital, mitigating credit risks, helping to create investment 
and financing vehicles, and enhancing borrowers’ governance structure and accounting system. 
CDB has actively cooperated, home and abroad commercial banks and financial institutions to 
provide syndicated loans to infrastructure sectors, such as China Construction Bank, Industrial & 
Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch, Barclays, BNP Paribas SA, Citigroup, and so on.
13
Table 4 Lenders Structure of CDB’s Largest 26 Loans
Loan Number Loan Value ($bn)
CDB
Syndicated
CDB
Syndicated
Total Domestic
Lenders
Foreign 
Lenders
Total Domestic
Lenders
Foreign 
Lenders
Non-infrastructure 8 2 2 0 64.5 9.1 9.1 0
Partial 
infrastructure
6 1 1 0
26.0 3.2 3.2
0
Infrastructure 9 14 10 4 70.5 60.5 45.6 14.9
Total 23 17 13 4 161.0 72.8 58.0 14.9
Source: Dealogic, China-Latin America Finance Database, and Author’s Calculation.
As displayed by Table A-1 and Table 4, among the largest 40 loans that CDB has participated 
to lend, there are 23 CDB’s sole loans and 17 syndicated loans, with a share of 57.5% and 42.5% 
respectively. The value of CDB’s sole loans amounts to $161.0bn, while that of its syndicated loans 
is $72.8bn, equaling to 42.5% of the former. In addition to cooperate with domestic commercial 
banks, CDB also chooses to work with foreign peers to provide infrastructure finance. The 
number and worth of CDB financed syndicated loans with foreign banks reaches 4, and $14.9bn 
respectively, with a share in the total syndicated loans of 30.8% and 20.5% correspondingly. Of 
the 14 syndicated loans to infrastructure sectors, CDB has occupied the status of sponsoring bank 
in 8 syndicated deals, with a share of 57.1% (see Table A-1). This reflects that CDB has produced 
significant crowd-in effect on infrastructure finance through attracting some domestic and foreign 
commercial banks and financial institutions to enter in the sectors. 
3.  Infrastructure Finance
3.1  Industry Structure
In compliance with the mission, CDB’s loans are mainly lent to the following sectors: 1) 
infrastructure, such as hydropower, rail transit, railway, subway, tugboat, coal export terminal, 
aviation and telecommunication; 2) energy and power, include oil & gas, LNG, gas pipeline, 
petroleum refining, offshore platform, offshore drilling, solar power, thermal power, nuclear 
power, hydropower, and electricity; 3) resources, for example, coal, metal, and mineral; 4) key 
and pillar industries, such as machinery, iron & steel, agriculture, finance, commodity trading, 
construction, and real estate; 5) key emerging sectors like microelectronics, consumer electronics, 
semiconductor, electric motor, and fiberglass (see Table 5).
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Table 5 Industries of China Development Bank’s Loans
Industries
2009 Coal, Semiconductor, Telecommunication, Fiberglass, 
2010 Telecommunication, Paper, Electric Motor, Expressway, Microelectronics, 
Electricity, Finance, Metal, LNG, Semiconductor, Oil, Consumer 
Electronics, Nuclear Power, Rail Transit, Infrastructure, Iron & Steel
2011 Coal Export Terminal, Finance, Telecommunication, Oil & Gas, Subway, 
Energy, Infrastructure, SWF, Agriculture, Bank, Finance, Metal, Real 
estate, Solar Power, Forest Plantation, Paper, Semiconductor, Coal
2012 Oil & Gas, Gas Infrastructure, Gas-Chemical Complex, Electricity, 
Finance, Electronics, Cotton, Machinery, Iron & Steel, Food, Power, 
Energy, Tourism, Rail Transit, Railway, Expressway, Commodity Trading, 
Resources, Construction, Infrastructure, telecommunication, Real estate, Key 
and Pillar Industries
2013 Oil & Gas, Gas Pipeline, Petroleum Refining, Railway, Metro, Media, 
Agriculture, Expressway, Offshore Platform, Offshore Drilling, Real 
Estate, Sports, Paper, Aviation Lease, Electricity, Tire, Construction, 
Tugboat, Electrical Equipment, Infrastructure, Resources, Commodity 
Trading, Investment Firm
2014 Mineral, Hydropower, Expressway, Crude Palm Oil, Thermal Power, 
Finance, Infrastructure, Real Estate, Engineering, Aviation, Electricity
April 2015 Infrastructure, Nuclear Power, Hydropower, Rail Transit, Railway, 
Electricity, Energy, Finance, Consumer Products, Iron and steel, Finance, 
Real Estate, Key and Pillar Industries
Source: Dealogic.
Infrastructure projects are the first priority areas of CDB finance and have received most of 
the lending from the bank. As the end of 2014, the share of CDB’s outstanding loan allocated 
into infrastructure sectors reached around 53.3%-55.3%. As seen in Figure 4, the infrastructure 
sectors include electric power, public highways, railway, and public infrastructure, whose share 
in CDB’s outstanding loan at the end of 2014 was 10.1%, 18.1%, 8.1%, and 17.0% respectively. 
Considering into that the volume of agriculture loans is generally much smaller than that of 
hydropower credits, it is highly possible that the share of hydropower loans exceeds half of the 
outstanding loans received by the sector of hydropower, agriculture and related industries. Hence, 
we can conveniently suppose the share of CDB’s loans reached around 2% as the end of 2014. 
According to the data released by CDB in the 2014 Sustainability Report, the bank has always 
played a leading role in China’s infrastructure finance. CDB’s credit lines are mainly allocated into 
sectors of transportation, power and energy, and urbanization infrastructure. The transportation 
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sectors mainly include construction projects of road, expressway, railway, city rail transit, and 
airport, while the power and energy sectors include generation projects of Power plants and 
stations, hydropower, wind and solar power, and renewable energy power. 
Figure 4 The Industry Breakdown of CDB’s Outstanding Loan as the end of 2014
Source: CDB(2015).
Note: The industry breakdown of the figure is CDB’s own criterion and definition of industries. It is possible that there 
existed some differences in the definition of industry between CDB and us. Due to the unclear definition of CDB,
wededuct petrochemical, post & telecommunications, and coal from infrastructure sectors in the figure.
As the end of 2014, CDB had lent cumulative loans of RMB 1.88tn ($303bn) to road construction 
projects, and which equaled to 2.93% of China’s GDP in 2014, of which expressway accounted 
for 72%, and the worth ranks first in china’s banking industry and reaches a share of 38% of the 
total road loan. CDB also had provided cumulative loan of RMB 824.8bn ($133bn) to railway 
construction projects, and supported 200 city rail transit projects and 87 airports construction 
projects. 
CDB had offered cumulative loan of RMB 1.97tn ($318bn) to power plants and stations 
construction projects, and which equaled to 3.07% of China’s GDP in 2014, with a share of 22 
percent of the total investment in China’s power industry. In rivers of Jinsha, Yangtze, Lancang and 
Yalong, CDB had supplied cumulative loan of RMB 461.1bn ($74.4bn) to hydropower generation 
projects as the end of 2014, with a share of 30% of the total investment in the area. 
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Table 6 CDB’s Infrastructure Loans as the end of 2014
Infrastructure Loan Value Remark
Road Cumulative loan
RMB 1.88tn 
($303bn)
38% of the total issued by China’s banking industry
1994-2013, the length of roads is 1.46mn km, 30% of the 
total built roads, of which expressway projects accounted 
for 72%
Railway Cumulative loan
RMB 824.8bn 
($133bn)
Total length is 60,000km, 60% of the total railway in 
operation
City
Rail Transit
Supporting 31 cities in building nearly 200 city rail transit 
projects, with a total length of nearly 4,000 km
Airports Supporting 87 airports construction at home and abroad, 
including 86 domestic ones or 45% of the total in China
Power Plants 
and Stations
Cumulative loan
RMB 1.97tn 
($318bn)
22% of the total investment in China’s power industry
Hydropower Cumulative loan
RMB 461.1bn 
($74.4bn)
In rivers of Jinsha, Yangtze, Lancang and Yalong, 30% of 
the total investment in the area
Wind and 
Solar Power
Balance loan
RMB 186.5bn 
($30.1bn)
Aggregate installation capacity reaches 39mn kw, which 
can save 22.4mn tons of standard coal and reduce CO2 
emission by 58.7mn tons a year
Wind power generating capacity reaches 31.42mn kw, 
33% the total in China during 2012-2014
Photovoltaic generating capacity reaches 6.9mn kw, 30% 
of the total from 2012 to 2014
Renewable 
Energy
Power 
Cumulative loan
RMB 206.5bn 
($33.3bn) 
Combined installation capacity of CDB-financed 
renewable energy power generation projects reaches 
33mn kw
Water 
Conservancy
Cumulative loan
RMB 406bn 
($65.5bn)
2,515 projects, over 40% provided by all banks in China
Urbanization 
Infrastructure 
Balance loan
RMB 1.79tn
($289bn)
Balance of loans to infrastructure projects calculated in 
CDB’s urbanization loan
Source: CDB. 
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CDB also places high emphasis on clean energy and renewable energy finance. As the end 
of 2014, CDB had provided balance loan of RMB 186.5bn ($30.1bn) to wind and solar power 
projects, which has brought about significantly positive effects on saving coal and reducing CO2 
emission. It has also given a cumulative loan of RMB 206.5bn ($33.3bn) to renewable energy 
power projects. It is important to note that CDB had also lent the balance loan of RMB 1.79tn 
($289bn) to urbanization infrastructure, equaling to 2.79% of China’s GDP in 2014, with a share 
of 23.6% of the bank’s total loans as of the end of 2014 (see Table 6).
According to an incomplete statistics of Dealogic Database and China-Latin America Finance 
Database listed in Table 7, CDB’s domestic and oversea loans cover infrastructure, energy, resources, 
key and pillar industries, and key emerging industries. In terms of deal number, the project developers 
from electricity (coal power, hydropower, and solar power), transportations (expressway, railway, 
Metro, rail transit, and aviation), petroleum and gas, resources, telecommuincation, and finance 
industry are relatively frequent traders with CDB, and which had conducted 48, 41, 27, 13, 8 
and 8 deals with CDB respectively, with a share of 19.8%, 16.8%, 11.2%, 5.3%, 3.3%, and 3.3% 
correspondingly during the period from 2008 to April 2015.
18
Table 7 Industry Structure of China Development Bank’s Loans From 2009 to April 2015
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Source: Dealogic and Author’s Calculation. 
Note: (1) Partial infrastructure means that a CDB’s loan has multiple uses, such as infrastructure, key and pillar industries, 
construction, and real estate. CDB has provided large amount of loans to some national and local governments’ 
financing and investment vehicles in China, such as State Development & Investment Corp(SDIC), Xinjiang State-
Owned Assets Management & Investment Co Ltd, Nanjing State-owned Assets Investment Management Holdings 
(Group) Co Ltd, Guangxi Beibu Gulf Investment Group Co Ltd, and Yunnan Urban Construction Investment Co Ltd. 
The business fields of these financing vehicles are mainly transportations, energy and resources, high technologies, 
real estates, construction, finance, education and sanitation. It is highly possible that more than half of these vehicles’ 
assets are allocated into infrastructure sectors, and hence CDB’s loans to them are mainly invested into infrastructures. 
So we regard CDB’s loans to the financing vehicles as partial infrastructure.
(2) Other infrastructures mainly include transportation infrastructures design and construction, power construction, 
port development and operation, logistics, transportation, tugboat, and telecommunications. And some firms operate in 
several infrastructure industries, and it is impossible to classify their businesses into certain single sector.
(3) It is worthy of noting that the percentages in Figure 4 are inconsistent with the numbers in this table 7. The 
differences are as follows: First, the former are from CDB, while the latter come from Dealogic; Second, the former 
are outstanding loans, while the later are aggregate values of loans during the period from 2008 to April 2015; Third, 
the former is complete, while the latter is incomplete due to difficulties in searching data of loans; Fourth, there are 
differences in definition of industry and infrastructure between CDB and us. 
 In terms of loan magnitude, petroleum and gas, transportations, and electricity are the three 
sectors that had received largest amount of CDB’s credit lines from 2008 to April 2015, with an 
aggregate worth of $100.1bn, $52.6bn, and $48.9bn respectively, and whose share in CDB’s total 
credit is 30.3%, 16.0%, and 14.9%. CDB also had extended relatively large amount of credits 
to sectors of finance, resources, iron and steel, and semiconductor, whose total volume of loans 
was $8.3bn, $6.1bn,$3.3bn, and $3.2bn respectively, with a share of 2.5%, 1.9%, 1.0%, and 1.0% 
correspondingly.
During the period between 2008 and April 2015, CDB had lent to 108 overseas projects, with a 
total worth of $199.0bn, and whose share in its total deal number and value was 44.4% and 60.2% 
respectively. This means that there existed around 60% of CDB’s credit had been allocated into 
overseas market, and hence it is highly possible that CDB is the highest internationalized bank in 
China mainland. 
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Table 8 CDB’s Loans to Infrastructure and Non-infrastructure from 2008 to April 2015
Source: Dealogic, China-Latin America Finance Database, and Author’s Calculation. 
Note: Comparing to coal power generation, hydropower generation can effectively reduces CO2 emission, and hence 
which can be generally regarded as sustainable infrastructure; “N-Hydro” denotes that hydropower is not calculated 
into the category of sustainable infrastructure; the Value/GDP is calculated by China’s GDP in 2014.
CDB has aggressively offered overseas credit lines to sectors of petroleum, coal power 
generation, railway, gas, hydropower, coal export terminal, finance, and resources since 2008, 
with a value of $85.9bn,$17.3bn,$12.4bn, $9.8bn,$8.9bn, $8.6bn, $5.5bn, and $3.9bn respectively, 
and the share in total loans of whose industry had received from CDB was 95.8%, 100%, 53.8%, 
94.2%, 100%, 21.7%, 66.4%, and 63.4% correspondingly. This reflects that CDB has played a 
critically important role in acquiring foreign resources and energy through financial support.
As seen in Table 8, CDB had extended a total of  243 loan deals to domestic and abroad 
enterprises from 2008 to April 2015, of which there are 139 infrastructure deals, 14 partial 
infrastructure deals and 90 non-infrastructure deals, with a share of 57.2%, 5.8%, and 37.0% 
respectively. Among CDB’s infrastructure loan deals, there are 76 sustainable infrastructure deals 
and 6 hydropower stations loans, whose share in total infrastructure deals is 54.7% and 4.3% 
respectively. If we regard hydropower station as sustainable infrastructure, CDB’s aggregate 
sustainable infrastructure deals amounts to 82, with a share of 59.0% in infrastructure projects. 
Over the period from 2008 to April 2015, CDB had supplied aggregate worth of $330.6bn 
of loans to Chinese and foreign enterprises, and of which there are $190.5bn, $41.1bn, and 
$99.0bn worth of credits had been allocated into infrastructure, partial infrastructure, and non-
infrastructure sectors, with a share in the total loan of 57.6, 12.4%, and 29.9% respectively, 
and which equals to 1.84%, 0.38%, and 0.98% of China’s GDP in 2014 correspondingly. CDB 
had lent $83.8bn, $25.9bn, and $80.8bn worth of loans to sustainable infrastructure projects, 
 Deal Number Deal Value ($bn) 
Total Infrastructure Total Infrastructure 
Partial Total Partial Total 
 Sustainable  Sustainable 
 N-
Hydro 
 N-
Hydro 
2008 5 0 4 0 0 5.3  0  5.0  0  0  
2009 14 1 3 2 2 44.7  4.0  10.4  10.3  10.3  
2010 36 0 21 11 11 58.6  0.0  49.7  17.8  17.8  
2011 33 2 13 6 6 32.6  4.1  16.7  4.9  4.9  
2012 47 4 27 15 14 30.4  6.8  16.3  7.9  7.9  
2013 56 2 39 21 21 53.9  5.1  34.7  15.1  15.1  
2014 24 1 17 14 12 34.4  4.7  24.1  22.2  15.0  
2015 28 4 15 13 10 70.7  16.3  33.6  31.5  12.9  
Total 243 14 139 82 76 330.6  41.1  190.5  109.7  83.8  
Value/GDP 3.20% 0.38% 1.84% 1.06% 0.81% 
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hydropower stations, and non-sustainable infrastructure projects respectively, whose share in the 
total infrastructure credits is 42.4%, 13.6%, and 44.0% respectively. If we calculate hydropower 
stations into sustainable infrastructure projects, CDB’s credit lines to sustainable infrastructure 
sectors amounted to $109.7bn, with a share in the total loans and infrastructure credits reached 
33.2% and 57.6% correspondingly, and which equals to 1.06% of China’s GDP in 2014 (see Table 
8). This means that the sustainable infrastructure sector is a priority field of CDB finance and has 
received nearly one third of CDB’s credits.
3.2  Sustainable Infrastructure Structure
CDB’s sustainable infrastructure finance mainly allocates into transportation, electricity 
power, energy(oil), and telecommunications sectors, including industries of expressway, metro 
and rail transit, railway, electricity power generation, thermal power, solar power, hydropower5, oil 
pipeline, and renewable energy. As shown by table 9, CDB had provided a large amount of loans 
to 82 sustainable infrastructure projects, with a total worth of around $109.7bn from 2008 to April 
2015. Of which, there are 27 overseas infrastructure projects, with an aggregate value of $42.9bn, 
and whose share in the number and value of the total sustainable infrastructure credit deals is 
39.1% and 32.9% respectively.
5 Although hydropower stations have negative effects on environment, they can do provide clean energy and reduce 
CO2 emission substantially comparing to coals. It is highly possible that positive effects of hydropower on CO2 
emission can overweight negative consequences on environment. Current China is suffering serious environment 
pollution particularly air pollution, hence reducing CO2 emission is critically important for China. Therefore, we 
regard hydropower stations as sustainable infrastructure projects in this section.
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Table 9 Industry Structure of China Development Bank’s Loans to Sustainable Infrastructure 
From 2008 to April 2015
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Source: Dealogic, China-Latin America Finance Database, and Author’s Calculation.
Note: Other sustainable infrastructure industries mainly include transportation infrastructures design and construction, 
port development and operation, logistics, transportation and telecommunications. Some firms operate in several 
infrastructure industries, and it is impossible to classify their businesses into certain single sector.
Hydropower generation station is the sector that had received largest amount of credit from 
CDB, with a total worth of $25.9bn, and whose share in the aggregate volume and sustainable 
infrastructure credit amounted to 7.8% and 23.6% respectively. Railway, metro and rail transit, 
expressway, energy(oil), nuclear power, telecommunications, and electricity power sectors are 
relatively large receivers of CDB’s credit lines, with a total value of $23.0bn, $16.6bn, $12.1bn, 
$10.2bn, $7.7bn, $5.3bn, and $5.3bn, whose share in the aggregate sustainable infrastructure 
finance is 21.0%, 15.2%, 11.0%, 9.3%, 4.9% and 4.8% respectively. 
In terms of deal number, the investors and developers of electricity, expressway, railway, metro 
and rail transit, telecommunication, and hydropower are relatively frequent credit borrowers of 
CDB fund, which had borrowed from CDB for 20, 13, 13, 11, 9, and 6 times respectively over the 
period from 2008 to April 2015, and whose share in the total deal number amounted to 24.4%, 
15.9%, 15.9%, 13.4%, 11.0%, and 7.3% correspondingly.
The priority fields of CDB’s overseas sustainable infrastructure finance are sectors of railway, 
energy, hydropower, telecommuincations, and electricity, whose total deal worth amounted to 
$12.4bn, $10.2bn, $8.9bn, $4.9bn, and $3.4bn during the period, and the share in whose industry 
was 53.8%, 100%, 34.2%, 92.3%, and 63.7% respectively. The deal number of the above five 
sectors was 3, 2, 4, 7, and 6, and the share in whose industry reached 23.1%, 100%, 66.7%, 77.8%, 
and 30.0% correspondingly.
4.  Case Studies
4.1  Wuhu Model 
Wuhu is a municipal city located in Anhui Province in East China, which has an average 
economic development. Ever since the Wuhu Model was established in 1998, the city has changed 
from a sleepy city in 1990s to a bustling metropolis today. It is also home to one of China’s most 
prominent carmakers, Chery Automobile Co. (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013).
According to comprehensiveness of urban construction such as Including land development 
and consolidation, road and subway construction, sewage disposal, and industry attraction, CDB 
created a new facility- bundled loans to Wuhu Municipal Government, with an intention to obtain 
average reward from total infrastructure projects combining profitable with non-profitable ones. 
On providing finance for urbanization of Wuhu government, CDB had created a new mode of 
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infrastructure loans. First, CDB cooperated with Wu government and established the first local 
government finance vehicle (LGFV) in China, the Wuhu Construction Investment Co., to mobilize 
land sales and bank loans to fund infrastructure investments. Second, to support the construction of 
six infrastructure projects, CDB provided ten-year bundled loans with a total worth of RMB 1.08bn 
($130.4mn) to the Wuhu Construction Investment Co., acting as the borrower and obligator of the 
loan (Yang, 2013). Finally, Wuhu government established repayment reserve fund and promised 
to use its future fiscal revenue to pay back the loan after ten years if the finance platform couldn’t 
sell the land. 
Figure 5 Wuhu Model Operation Method
Source: Sanderson and Forsythe (2013). 
In 1990s, Chinese local governments extremely lack fund to develop infrastructure in the urban 
areas, and the investment rewards of infrastructure projects were so low that it is hard for CDB to 
earn positive profit from single infrastructure project finance. 
As Figure 5 shows, the LGFV, Wuhu Construction Investment Co., had played a central role 
in the Wuhu model, acting as a land bank with functions of land reserve and transfer, borrowing 
loans from CDB secured by land transfer revenue, carrying out infrastructure construction with 
borrowed fund, and paying back loans to CDB. In this sense, the Wuhu model can be regarded as 
a land-backed model. 
The Wuhu had created a virtuous cycle in infrastructure construction and urbanization. More 
public infrastructures investment like roads and subways would boost home prices, which in 
turn would boost land prices. Higher land prices would mean more local government income, 
and hence more infrastructure investment and public goods spending(Sanderson and Forsythe, 
2013). This effectively accelerates Wuhu’s infrastructure construction, urbanization and economic 
development. From then on, the Wuhu Model was extensively replicated across the country, with 
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CDB lending money to LGFVs in Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, as well as the canal city of 
Suzhou. 
CDB’s successful experience in the field of financing for urban infrastructure construction has 
produced substantial demonstration effects. Almost all of Chinese banks, such as the “big four” 
banks - Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Bank of China, and 
Agricultural Bank of China, the other national banks, and the local “city” banks, choose to follow 
CDB and make their loans to infrastructure sectors.
The 2008 global financial crisis and subsequent China’s RMB 4tn ($575bn) stimulus plan 
had greatly pushed forward the application of the Wuhu model in China nationwide, equaling to 
12.6% of China’s GDP in 2008, and loans of LGFVs constituted important assets for all Chinese 
commercial banks. Every province, city and even county in China has now set up similar LGFVs 
to finance infrastructure investments. The Wuhu model now even has been expanded to many 
developing countries, from Africa to Latin America, due to CDB’s recently aggressive expansion 
in developing world. 
However, the main problem of LGFVs is insufficient transparency. Under conditions that 
aggressive expansion of LGFVs, a large amount of unhealthy assets have been incorporated into 
LGFVs by Chinese local governments. The European sovereign debt crisis and rapidly rising debt 
remind China of the risk of local government debt crisis. Now, Chinese government has taken 
measures to strengthen supervision on LGFVs and constrain its development speed. 
4.2  Tianjin Model
Tianjin model is an updated and advanced version of Wuhu Model. In April 2003, CDB signed 
the biggest loan agreement in China at the time with the land bank of Tianjin, Tianjin Center for 
Land Reserve and Consolidation, a loan of RMB 50bn ($6.0bn), part of which was later handed 
over to the financing vehicle, Tianjin City Infrastructure Construction and Investment Company 
Ltd, established in November 2004 under the guide of CDB.
According to the agreement, the loan was divided into a RMB 24bn ($2.9bn) soft loan and 
RMB 26bn ($3.1bn) hard loan, with a total maturity of 15 years including 5 years of construction 
period. In the first five years, Tianjin only had to pay back interest on the loan to CDB; in the last 
ten years, the city should pay back principle and interest on the loan. The interest rate was 10 
percent below the benchmark rate for the soft loan and 10 percent below the benchmark rate for 
the hard loan for the first five years. In total, it was 8 percent below normal interest rate of loans.
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Table 10 Tianjin’s Infrastructure Construction and Land Reserve and Consolidation Programs
Millions of Dollars
Project Investment 
Volume
CDB’s Loan Internal 
FinanceHard 
Loan
Soft Loan
Urban expressway 209 173 106 66 36
Hai riverside 
infrastructure 
development 237 190 129 60 47
Two subway lines 254 127 0 127 127
Greening of the City 978 91 54 36 7
Land reserve and 
consolidation 121 24 24 0 97
Total 918 604 314 290 314
Source: CDB.
The original loan contract was to provide credit to four infrastructure projects including urban 
expressway, two subway lines, greening of the city, and Hai riverside infrastructure development, 
and one project for land reserve and consolidation. As Table 10 shows, the main contents of 
the infrastructure financing contracts are as follows: 1) urban expressway system includes one 
expressway circle, four expressway lines, and two expressway connection lines, with a total 
investment value of RMB 17.3bn ($209mn) and RMB 14.3bn ($173mn) borrowed from CDB; 2)
Hai riverside infrastructure development includes river widening, sewage disposal, water drainage, 
and bridge construction, with a total investment worth of RMB 19.6bn ($237mn) and RMB 15.7bn 
($190mn) coming from CDB; 3) two subway lines with a total length of 51km and 42 stations, and 
aggregate investment worth of RMB 21bn ($254mn) and RMB 10.5bn ($127mn) borrowed from 
CDB; 4)City greening projects with total greening volume of 5.88 million m3, with aggregate 
investment worth of RMB 8.1bn ($978mn) and RMB 7.5bn ($91mn) coming from CDB(Project 
Team of China Development Bank and Renmin University of China, 2007). 
Regarding the guarantee and repayment of the debt, Tianjin government promised to use 15 
years of land usage rights sales to secure the huge infrastructure loans, including 96.35km2 of 
central city land and 100.9 km2 of suburb land, both to act as collateral and as a source to pay 
back the funds. The city government also promised to use its own infrastructure fund to pay back 
the loans if land usage rights sales ran into difficulties. It is obvious that land collateral had played 
a fundamental role in Tianjin government’s commitment of the loan repayment. In CDB’s later 
overseas loans in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, resources and petroleum collateral also acted as 
the same important role as the Tianjin model. 
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Considering into expressway, city greening, sewage disposal and subway can’t create 
meaningful net cash flow for the government, hence it is an impossible task for the infrastructure 
finance vehicle to repay CDB’s loans. Therefore, the money to pay back the infrastructure loans will 
nearly all come from the income of land usage rights sale. To assure the safety of the infrastructure 
loans, CDB had established a perfect supervision mechanism on the repayment of principle and 
interest, focus on supervising the movement and transfer of the government income from land 
usage rights sale. The land bank sells a land usage rights and the proceeds go straight into its 
account at Tianjin’s CDB branch before being transferred to the city government’s account in the 
same bank. After the payment to cost of land reserve and consolidation, and national treasury, 
CDB could thus automatically take the principle and interest it was owed and could supervise the 
process of funds transfer (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013). This model of supervision mechanism 
has been replicated in almost all of CDB’s land or resource backed loans later, particularly the 
petroleum backed loans in Latin America. 
The infrastructure loans have produced substantial positive effects on Tianjin’s economic and 
social development, such as, the improvement in public infrastructures like expressway, subway 
and water transportation, the progress in city greening, the reform of infrastructure finance and 
investment institution, and standardization of land reserve, consolidation and transfer. Partly due to 
the contribution of the huge infrastructure loans, Tianjin has shown a strong growth momentum and 
the GDP growth rate has always been significantly higher than national average level. The success 
of Tianjin model has unleash a wave of infrastructure construction in China, from expressways, 
railways, ports, and hydropower stations to local metro lines, government stadiums, apartment 
complexes, and commercial buildings, helping China to accelerate the urbanization process with a 
speed never seen before in history. 
5.  Practices and Policies of CDB’s Sustainable Infrastructure Finance 
5.1  Stages of Infrastructure Finance
During the practice of infrastructure finance, CDB has gradually formed the ideology of 
developing healthy enterprises, fiscal positions, finances and economy. Under the guidance of 
the ideology, CDB has established a systematic operation mechanism of infrastructure finance 
with the following four main stages: planning in advance; project selection; project support or 
“development finance incubation”; project exit or “market exit” (infrastructure loans repayment). 
The first stage is planning in advance. Planning in advance is the starting point of CDB’s 
cooperation with local governments and infrastructure developers. To reduce blind investment 
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and duplicate construction, and increase the possibility of success of infrastructure finance, CDB 
actively supports local governments and infrastructure developers to design social, regional, 
industrial, and market development plans for potential infrastructure projects, through providing 
technical support loans and consulting services (Chen, 2009, 2010; Hu, 2016). 
The second stage is project selection, which mainly reflects local governments’ project 
recommendations or “governments’ entrance” called by CDB. Local governments’ entrance or 
projects recommendation means that they choose some infrastructure projects and recommend 
them to CDB to apply for credit support, based on national industry policies and local development 
strategy. After considering into factors such as local economic development level, fiscal position, 
debt agreements implementation, and credit ratings, CDB decides the amount of credit lines 
extended to these recommended infrastructure projects.  
The third stage is project support or “development finance incubation” denoted by CDB. 
Through credit enhancement measures (necessary fiscal funding and policy support) from local 
governments and infrastructure finance provision, CDB attempts to help infrastructure developers 
to improve their governance structure, legal entity, cash flow and credit worthiness. This will help 
infrastructure developers to enhance their fiscal positions, financing capabilities, and management 
abilities in infrastructure investment. 
The final stage is project exit or “market exit” expressed by CDB. Based on the expectation 
and assessment of future cash flow of infrastructure projects, CDB designs different repayment 
mechanisms in terms of the nature and use of infrastructure loan, such as ordinary loan repayment, 
parent company repurchase, IPOs, bond issuance, and government repurchase. CDB has formed a 
mature operation mode, for example, it shows local governments how to enhance credit worthiness 
of local investment and financing vehicles and to adopt what kinds of policies to support the 
vehicles, how to assess local governments’ fiscal position, debt default risk, and infrastructure 
investment capability (Chen, 2009, 2010).
5.2  Experience of Infrastructure Finance
In the practice of infrastructure and urbanization finance in China, an important experience of 
CDB is to help Chinese local governments to create uniform investment and financing vehicles and 
establish a standardized infrastructure investment and financing system. China’s local governments 
have established state-owned asset management companies or city construction and investment 
companies to act as investment and financing vehicles one by one, which represents the government 
to acquire external finance, manage government investment projects, repay government debt, and 
coordinate the relationship between governments and CDB (Chen, 2009, 2010).
CDB’s experience shows that the investment and financing vehicles have played critically 
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important role in improving governments’ capabilities of debt (loan) management and reducing 
CDB’s credit risk in infrastructure finance. The investment and financing vehicles have 
successfully explored new important source of funding for local governments, radically changed 
their extreme scarcity in external finance, and significantly stimulated the rapid development of 
infrastructure construction and urbanization. However, the aggressive expansion in the loan debt 
of the investment and financing vehicles has led to a substantial increase in local governments’ 
liabilities and significantly worsened their default risks. 
Combine the advantage of coordination of local governments and CDB’s advantage of    financing. 
CDB’s another experience is to cooperate with local governments and combine their advantages 
of coordination and its advantage of financing. Comparing to western advanced countries, China’s 
market is impaired and immature, and local governments in China are deeply involved in economic 
activities, and they have played critically important roles in managing and regulating local 
economies. CDB chooses to cooperate with local governments to create infrastructure investment 
and financing vehicles, local governments recommend targeted infrastructure projects to CDB 
based on local economic development strategy, and CDB provides credit to the recommended 
infrastructure projects through the investment and financing vehicles. This can help to lessen the 
problems of insufficient credit supply in infrastructure sector. 
Promote market development through infrastructure finance. During the process of project 
financing and monitoring, CDB attempts to enhance infrastructure developers’ capabilities of 
self-development, self-governance, market operation, and risk prevention and control, through 
improving their governance structure, legal entity, cash flow and credit worthiness, so that the 
developers can finally become healthy market agents. Through CDB’s endeavour in market 
construction, some infrastructure sectors in China have successfully shifted from the public fields 
that commercial banks have low willingness to enter into to the commercialized sectors rich in 
competition among private investors.
Manage credit risk through society co-construction. CDB has carried out reform in the system 
of loans provision procedures and credit risk assessment, and established a comprehensive risk 
management framework, which lays a solid foundation for CDB’s good performance. Also, CDB 
has formed the ideology of society financialization and finance socialization. CDB attempts to 
mobilize the powers of governments, market, enterprises, and society, and establish a strong 
network of risk management to reduce information asymmetry, strengthen social and uniform 
supervision, enhance operation transparency, and overcome the weakness of its sole supervision, 
such as lacking scale effect, high supervision cost, insufficient employee, and information 
asymmetry (Chen, 2009, 2010).
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5.3  Social and Environmental Safeguards
As a member of the International development finance club (IDFC), a network of renowned 
national and sub-regional development banks which recently has focused on sustainable 
infrastructure finance, CDB places a great emphasis on the implementation of social and 
environmental safeguards when provides infrastructure finance. Among the state-owned banks 
in China, CDB is the first to join the United Nations Global Compact. The Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is an integral part of CDB’s business strategies, day-to-day operations and 
well ingrained in its corporate culture. CDB has obtained some awards in social and environmental 
safeguards for consecutive years in the past decades, such as “Responsible Business for the People” 
and “Socially Responsible Bank of the Year” (IDFC, 2015).
Although CDB has taken some specific steps to fulfill its environmental and social 
responsibilities, such as publishing annual sustainability report and environmental policy, 
improving environmental and social performance at home and abroad, and aggressively finances 
renewable energy projects globally. Some views criticized that CDB’s environmental and social 
standards for burgeoning international lending, especially for natural resource and infrastructure 
projects fall short of best practice, particularly in terms of sector-specific standards, transaction 
transparency, adequate consultation of local stakeholders in decision making processes and 
grievance mechanisms (Friends of the Earth, 2012). 
Also, based on a systematic investigation of CDB’s lending practices in the Latin America 
during the period from 2005 to 2011, Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski (2012) claimed that CDB’s loans 
had less favorable terms, carried few policy conditions, and imposed less stringent environmental 
guidelines than those of international financial institutions (IFIs) and Western banks, but it often 
required equipment purchases and sometimes oil sale agreements. 
6.  Comments and Policy Suggestions
Although there are some criticisms on CDB, such as aggressive investment behaviors, carrying 
enormous risks from domestic land-backed loans and overseas petroleum-backed loans, insufficient 
transparency, and neglecting social and environmental safeguards, it is undoubted that CDB’s 
infrastructure finance has achieved great success in the past fifteen years. The following four aspects 
can reflect CDB’s success in infrastructure finance: 1) the magnitude CDB’s loan, profit, and asset 
has experienced dramatic expansion, and its non-performing loan ratio has been kept below 1.0 
percent for 35 consecutive quarters; 2) China’s infrastructure development has achieved impressive 
performance, shifting from a country extremely lacking of infrastructure services and finance, to 
an economy with relatively sufficient capital supply (attracting commercial banks to enter into 
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infrastructure) and strong construction abilities in infrastructure sectors; 3)China’s infrastructure 
investment and urbanization has realized beneficial cycle, through creating investment and financial 
vehicles for local governments; 4) large amount of infrastructure investment has made a significant 
contribution to China’s rapid economic growth. 
The most valuable experience of CDB’s infrastructure finance is to integrate infrastructure 
investment to China’s rapid urbanization, and realize finance sustainability (earn positive profits) 
through creating some innovative financing facilities and mechanisms, such as local governments 
investment and finance vehicles, bundling loans, and debt repayment mechanisms including land 
(resource, energy)-backed loans and accounts supervision of borrowers’ land (resources) sale 
income. Based on the above analysis, the success of CDB in infrastructure finance can be mainly 
attributed to the following six factors:
• First, planning in advance. Antecedent research and planning in advance can provide 
valuable guide on infrastructure investment, and hence can improve the efficiency of 
CDB’s infrastructure finance and investment. 
• Second, highly integrating infrastructure investment to urbanization. Urbanization can 
stimulate demand on infrastructure and increase fee income of infrastructure, while 
infrastructure investment can lead to a rise in price of the land and real estate along 
infrastructure projects. However, an important precondition for the virtuous cycle is that 
the invested area should have large potential of development.
• Third, helping local governments to create investment and financing vehicles. The financing 
vehicles find new capital sources for local governments, enhance the efficiency and 
flexibility of the infrastructure loans and investment, and facilitate the smooth repayment 
of CDB’s land-backed loans. However, the problems of the vehicles are low transparency 
in assets, encouraging excessive borrowing of local governments, and heightening local 
public debt default risks. 
• Fourth, extending land, energy or resource-backed loans. Under conditions that a local or 
central government has low credit worthiness or low willingness to provide guarantees for 
an infrastructure project, land or energy and resource (petroleum & gas)-backed loans can 
help to assure the smooth repayment and the sustainability of CDB’s infrastructure loan.
• Fifth, cooperating with local governments to stimulate market development. Local 
governments are generally providers and developers of sustainable infrastructure, and have 
policy and fund resources for the sustainable development of the invested infrastructures. 
Cooperating with local governments can facilitate CDB to closely follow local development 
plan, acquire information of potential infrastructure projects, reduce project selection cost, 
and obtain favorable policy treatments. 
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• Sixth, helping developers to enhance the capabilities in infrastructure management. 
CDB’s success is fundamentally decided by the development of infrastructure developers. 
It is wise for CDB to enhance loan recipients and infrastructure developers’ capabilities 
in management of infrastructure projects, through improving their governance structure, 
legal entity, cash flow and credit worthiness.
It is important to note that there existed two critical preconditions for the success of CDB’s 
home land-backed loans and the smooth repayment of its overseas energy or resources- securitized 
loans. These were the boom of Chinese economy and real estate market, and the “super business 
cycle” of global commodity market driven by China’s strong demand. Now, the two preconditions 
cannot hold any longer. With the significant slow-down of the economy, China’s real estate and 
land market has already lost the momentum of growth. Following from this the land sale incomes 
of local governments will decline, and hence their capability of infrastructure investment and debt 
repayment will also weaken. Also, the collapse of prices of petroleum and other commodities has 
seriously hit the economies heavily dependent on commodity exports, and it is highly possible that 
these governments would not be able to mobilize sufficient funds to repay CDB’s energy-backed 
loan.
With the end of high-speed growth era in China, and the resulting collapse of the super boom in 
Chinese land market and global commodity market, it is certain that CDB’s brilliant performance 
in the past fifteen years can’t reoccur any more. Although the implantation of  “One Belt and One 
Road” has provided a large space for CDB to grow, and CDB has established a project reserve 
with dozens of potential projects in infrastructure and key industry (Hu, 2016), the region along 
the “One Belt and One Road” has a high investment risk (Wang and Li, 2015), and so CDB should 
be cautious when it copies its past experience in this region. 
In regards with the possibility of the duplication or generalization of CDB’s experience in 
infrastructure finance, the answer is yes. Actually, Chinese government has taken some specific 
steps to generalize CDB’s experience, such as the newly established AIIB and New Development 
Bank, and the implementation of the initiative of “One Belt and One Road” focusing on 
infrastructure connection between neighbor countries. It is certain that CDB’s experiences in 
infrastructure finance are valuable for the national development banks in emerging and developing 
countries, and multinational development banks. However, we should take cautious attitude on 
other development banks how to learn CDB’s experiences. 
Regarding the generalization and viability of Wuhu and Tianjin Models for China in the longer 
run and abroad, there is no certain answer, because it depends on the system of land ownership 
and land market development. For China, it is sure that the potential of rise in prices of land and 
real estate has been quite limited in the long run, and hence CDB shouldn’t expect that the strong 
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beneficial cycle of infrastructure investment and land price rising will occur again in the near 
future. However, China still has large potential to push forward its urbanization and transfer rural 
population to urban area, and the land is still the most valuable asset for China’s local governments, 
therefore, the Wuhu and Tianjin model can be duplicated in China’s infrastructure finance in the 
long run. Considering that there exists large differences between China and some developing 
countries in the system of land ownership, it is quite difficult to duplicate Wuhu and Tianjin model 
in other emerging and developing countries. 
In terms of energy or resources-securitized infrastructure loans, there still exists large potential 
to develop, particularly for those capital recipient countries with relatively weak fiscal positions, 
although the collapse of commodity prices has dramatically reduced the value of the collaterals. 
Of course, to stimulate the smooth repayment of cross-border infrastructure loan, the governments 
of recipient countries should provide some guarantees if needed. 
CDB’s other five important experiences, such as planning in advance, highly integrating 
infrastructure investment to urbanization, helping local governments to create investment and 
financing vehicles, cooperating with local governments to stimulate market development, and 
helping developers to enhance the capabilities in infrastructure management, are valuable for 
national development banks in emerging and developing countries to learn from. However, there 
are no universal best practices in the world. The national banks should innovatively borrow from 
CDB’s experience in infrastructure finance based on their local conditions of economic and market 
development. 
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40
Source: Dealogic, China-Latin America Finance Database, and Author’s Collection.
Note: * China Development Bank is the largest credit contributor or a main sponsor of the syndicated loan. 
** A loan can be divided into different tranches, and each tranche has a different maturity, so there are some maturities 
for a loan. 
***China Development Bank and Ministry of Water Resource of China signed an agreement on March 18, 2015, 
and the former committed to provide a total amount of RMB 90bn (USD 14187mn) long-term credit to several major 
hydropower projects in 2015, so the No.1 deal will include several deals. 
The deal value of a syndicated loan is the total amount that the syndicated bank group has provided, not the size 
that China Development Bank has solely contributed. The deal value is ranked by the amount of syndicated loan not 
CDB’s credit.
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